Formal Notice Ahead of 10 December 2026 (APP 1.7–1.9): Workforce Australia / APM Demerits, False PPE Note, Unpaid $100 & Downstream Service Restriction (CAS-2634696-N6Q0V3)

Dear DEWR National Customer Service Line, APM Complaints & Privacy Teams, Services Australia AI Accountable Official & FOI Branch, OAIC, and Copied Cross-Bench Senators, I am submitting this formal evidentiary consolidation under DEWR Case CAS-2634696-N6Q0V3 (CRN: 204 349 615K | JSKID: 3420718409 | NDIA Participant: 567168465 | CRRS Ref: M11407095-2) to connect the complete chronological chain from provider-level record distortion through to cross-agency service restrictions—and to place all parties on formal notice ahead of the 10 December 2026 commencement of Australian Privacy Principles 1.7–1.9 (Automated Decision-Making Transparency). 1. The Direct Chain of Events: From False Provider Records to Cross-Agency Restriction Every administrative barrier I have faced traces back through the Workforce Australia / Disability Employment Services provider pipeline to DEWR and Services Australia: - Fabricated PPE & Employment Fund Refusal: When pursuing a Traffic Control course, APM staff member Alicia stated on the telephone that I could not be supplied with mandatory Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) because I had "already had it with other APMs." That statement is factually false: I never received PPE or equipment funding from any other APM branch. Unverified historical notes in the shared provider database were used as a pretext to withhold Employment Fund support. - Overturned Compliance Demerits (15 September 2023 & 15 January 2024): Two compliance demerits were imposed on my record despite valid job-search compliance. Both demerits were formally contested and overturned—an outcome that rarely occurs without clear provider error—yet the underlying adverse entries and backend codes (including H02/H13) remained active in system logs. - Unpaid $100 Smartphone Approval (CRRS M11407095-2): Following a Customer Resolution and Referral Service review on 7 March 2024, APM confirmed in writing: "We have approved to fund for basic smart phone to the value $100.00." Following my provider transfer on 4 March 2024 and purchase on 11 March 2024, APM complaints officer Kylie failed to pay the approved $100 and instead imposed two separate communication management plans restricting my contact. - Escalation Failure & Downstream Services Australia Restriction (MSP 2000109078): When I escalated these failures by telephone to Workforce Australia / DEWR and Services Australia, no substantive audit or remediation occurred. Instead, Services Australia subsequently imposed its own Managed Service Plan (MSP 2000109078, active through 19 April 2027), replicating the exact communication restriction pattern initiated at APM—which then migrated into my NDIA file (FOI 26/27-0675, Part 3, p. 197), citing "restricted Service Australia status, due to too many FOI requests" and noting my use of assistive AI technology. 2. Formal Notice Ahead of 10 December 2026 (APP 1.7–1.9) On 10 December 2026, mandatory Automated Decision-Making transparency obligations under Australian Privacy Principles 1.7–1.9 take legal effect across federal agencies and regulated entities. Backend flags, shared provider assertions, and automated triage rules that substantially and directly inform decisions affecting a citizen's entitlements, funding, or service access can no longer be treated as unreviewable internal metadata. 3. Required Action Before 10 December 2026 Before the 10 December 2026 statutory commencement date, I require written confirmation from DEWR, APM, and Services Australia of: 1. Immediate payment of the approved $100.00 smartphone reimbursement (CRRS M11407095-2) to my nominated NAB account already on file; 2. Formal purging and correction of all false or superseded provider entries—specifically the false "already received PPE" note, the overturned 15 September 2023 and 15 January 2024 demerit records, and unverified backend flags (H02/H13)—across DEWR, APM, and Services Australia databases; 3. Independent review and revocation of Managed Service Plan MSP 2000109078, which mirrors APM's prior communication restrictions without verified evidentiary basis; and 4. Full disclosure of all inter-agency data transfers and automated flags shared between APM, DEWR, and Services Australia (linked to Services Australia FOI LEX 93986, LEX 95192, LEX 95433, and LEX 95817). Kind regards, Thomas Brecelic (also recorded as Ivan Brecevic / Frank Russell) CRN: 204 349 615K | JSKID: 3420718409 DEWR Case: CAS-2634696-N6Q0V3 | NDIA Participant: 567168465 Truth Sequences Archive: https://www.google.com/url?q=http://truthsequences.blogspot.com&source=gmail&ust=1794562623346000&sa=E

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